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ABSTRACT 
This article presen ts an overview of a project designed to simulate the distribu-
tion of seats in the European Parliament after the first direct elections in 1978. 
First, the data base and some basic assumptions are described which pertain to 
electoral systems, voter behavior, and realignments in party systems. Same illustra-
tive results of sirnulation runs are summarized which proceed from voter preferences 
as expressed in the rnost recent national general elections in the nine member coun-
tries of the European Community. These fmdings are analyzed for individual parlies 
and parliamentary fractions as well as with the chances for forming majority coali-
tions in mind. Finally, the effects of some ükely slti{ts in voting pattems are con-
sidered assuming !hat current national electoral SYStems will be applied in 1978. 
[ntroduction 
The focus of this article is on the distribution of seats in the first 
directly elected European Parliarnent among individual parties from the 
nine member countlies of the European Community within predeter-
mined national representations. This distribution is simulated from a 
nurober of assumptions about electoral systems, voter preferences, and 
• This paper is a condensed version of some parts of an extensive study of the 
direct elections to the European Parliament which has been prepared for the 
Konrad Adena~er Foundation and is going to be pu blished in German under the 
title Mandatsverteilungen im Europäischen Parlamer,t nach der Direktwah/: Eine 
Simu/ationsstudie. 
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realignments among national parties. We do not aim to predict which 
electoral system is likely to be applied in the fJISt direct election of 
Spring 1978 or in subsequent elections. Neither do we want to forecast 
distributions in the popular vote or changes in voters' preferences or 
national party systems resulting from the political context of the direct 
election. 
lf one 1s Willing to assume a specific distribution of votes and a spe-
cific procedure for translating votes into seats, it becomes possible to 
derive the resulting distribution of seats analytically and without a 
margin of error. Uncertainty thus pertains only to assumptions. The 
utility of such an enterprise for practical purposes accordingly depends 
upon whether the set of assumptions includes the most plausible and 
relevant on~ 
Earlier attempts to sirnulate the composition of the European Parlia-
ment after the first direct elections (Rose, 197 5; Vido, 1975) were 
handicapped by the Iack of infonnation on the final total nurober of 
members in the new Parliament as weU as on the number of seats accru-
ing to each of the nine nations. Now this controversial tssue has been 
settled by the agreement rnade between the nine in the Summer of 
1976, the major obstacle to a study such as ours was removed. We 
therefore present an investigation of the distribution of seats in the 
European I'arliament after the direct election which proceeds from the 
national representations as they are given in Table I [ 1). 
This article will now summarize our study in three sections. The first 
section deals with the raw data. The second section presents an over· 
view of our assumptions on electoral systems, changes in voter prefer· 
ences, and conceivable alliances among parties. In the fmal section we 
TADLE I 
Composition of the Europeon Parliament 
Country S<ats prior to SealSafter Population pe1 Seat 
1978 1978 
Be!gium 14 24 408,000 
Denmark 10 16 317,000 
Gc:Imany 36 81 763,000 
France 36 81 651,000 
Grea t Britain 36 81 693,000 
Ireland 10 15 208,000 
ltaly 36 81 689,000 
Luxembourg 6 6 60,000 
Netherlands 14 25 564,000 
Total 198 410 Mean 635,000 
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will selectively illustrate the kind of substantial findings produced by 
our simulation.' 
The Data 
The distribution of seats in the European Parliarnent was to be simu-
lated on the basis of the results of the most recent national general elec-
tion in each member country. As one of the electoral systemstobe 
simulated was the plurality formula in single member constituencies, 
outcorries of recent national general elections had to be collected at a 
Ievel of aggregation which permitted their conversion into a nurober of 
single member constituencies corresponding to the number of seats in 
the European Parliament allotted to each member nation. Available 
compilations of electoral statistics (Rokkan and Meyriat, 1969; Mackie 
and Rose, 1974) were thus inadequate for our purposes as they present 
election results only at the national Ievel. Accordingly we had to collect 
the data required ourselves. The dates of the national elections from 
which our data base is drawn are given in Table II. 
Forthose coun tri es where the electorallaws allow the individual voter 
to cast more than one vote or - as in the case of France - require more 
than one voting act, we had to face the additional problern of deciding 
on the set of data to be used. For the Federal Republic of Germany the 
second votes ("Zweitstimmen") were most appropriate because these 
votes exclusively determine the distribution of seats in the Bundestag 
among parties. In I 976 the eieetarate was weil aware of this fact, and 
generally there was little split-ticket voting. French voting pattems in 
the second ballot can be analysed only within the national electoral 
system and within the present apportionment of constituencies so that 
TABLE I! 
Dates of Recent Elections in Nations of the European Commu nity 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
F.:rance 
Great Britain 
Ireland 
ltaly 
Luxembourg 
Notherlands 
Date 
March !0, 1974 
January 9. 1975 
October 3, 1976 
March 4and !1, 1973 
October 10, !974 
February 28, 1973 
June 20, 1976 
May 26, !974 
November 29, 1972 
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we had to take the distribution of votes in the first ballot as our raw 
data. In the case of Ireland the same set of reasons applies. Only 
the Irish electorallaw allows the indication ofsecond, third, etc. prefer-
ences, and these preferences cannot be combined for regional units 
other than the original ones. 
The electorallaw of Luxembourg allows each voter to cast the same 
number of votes as there are sets to be allocated in each respective con-
stituency. As the number of seats varies among constituencies we have a 
problern not of selection but of transforrnation. Assuming that in the 
election to the European Parliament each voter would have only one 
vote to cast we app!ied a weighting procedure by dividing the nurober 
of votes obtained by each party in each constituency by the average 
number of votes per ballot in this constituency. 
For all countfies except Italy data were available for regional sub-
units small enough to permit the construction of single member con-
stituencies in order to simulate a plurality formula. The smallest unit 
for which outcomes from the June 1976 election in Italy were avail-
able, however, were 94 provinces some of which by far exceeded tho 
average size of the 81 constituencies which had to be apportionei:i: -In 
order to create these 8 1 constituencies we had to resort to an approxi-
mation whenever necessary. Whenever a province had to be regionally 
subdivided, we split up the votes obtained by each party in this prov-
ince according to the distribution of the party's votes in the elec-
tions to the Senate of 1972, for which results for smaller units are 
available. This approximation does not assume a relationship between 
voting patterns or even shares of votes in the elections to the Senate of 
1972 and the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of 1976. It only 
requires that the votes obtained by each party in one election and in 
one province be distributed among the sub-regions of this province in 
accordance with the votes won in this province in the other election -
regardless of relative vote shares in both elections. This, of course, is a 
testable assumption, and we have tested it with positive results at a 
higher Ievel of aggregation for which complete data from both elections 
were available. 
Assumptions 
Electoral systems, distributions of votes and their changes, and party 
configurations are our independent variables. Our simulation was based 
upon a series of assumptions on each of these variables, and the 
following sub-sections contain a summary of these assumptions. 
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ELECTORALSYSTEMS 
All in all the effects of four different electoral systems were simu-
lated: plurality in single member constituencies and proportional 
representation for all nine members of the European Community, for 
each nation the system adopted for its national parliamentary elections, 
and, fmally, proportional representation at a regional Ievel for Germany 
and Britain. Current national election systems were added to the forrner 
two systems as the first direct election in 1978 will be govemed by 
electorallaws passed by each individual state which will probably adopt 
the major features of current national electoral systems. Proportional 
repres'entation at the regional Ievel is only simulated for Britain and 
Germany since these are the only countries where this kind of provision 
is being discussed - apart, of course, from those countries like Belgium, 
Ireland, and Italy where this kind of system is currently in use. 
The system of plurality in single member constituencies does not by 
itself permit the translation of a given popular vote into a distribution 
of seats among the competing parties. Given a specific popular vote 
different apportionments of constituencies may produce variations in 
the distribution of seats. In order to grasp the partisan effects of differ-
ent ways of setting up constituencies we assembled these constituencies 
in three ways. First, onJy geographical and demographic criteria were 
applied, and no deliberate partisan bias was introduced. Then constitu-
encies were designed with the explicit aim of favouring either the major 
!eft wing or the major right wing party in each nation. 
Proportional representation at the national Ievel was simulated with 
six variants: Two electoral formulae (the d'Horidt method of highest 
averages and the electoral quotient method with surplus seats being 
distributed according to the method of largest remainders), each com-
bined with three barrier clauses (0, 5, and 10 percent). 
Five of the nine members of the European Community currently 
employ electoral systems which cannot be regarded as simple plurality 
or proportional representation. Three of these countries - Belgium, 
Italy, and Luxembourg - apply proportional representation at the 
regional Ievel. Belgian pJans for redistricting for the direct election for 
the European Parliament are already known and we adopted them for 
our simulation. For Italy and Luxembourg, on the other hand, we have 
to remernher that the effects of proportional representation at the sub-
national Ievel can only be preserved if the average size of constituencies 
is not significantly changed when applying this system to the lower 
number of seats in the European Parliament. This consideration implies 
that the sub-national apportionment of seats has to be abandoned in 
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the case of Luxembourg. For Italy, a similar straightforward solution is 
not available so that in the absence of some infonnation on what the 
Itatians are planning to do we decided to divide the country into con-
stituencies in three different ways, varying their size as weil as number. 
France and Ireland currently have electoral systems which posed 
particularly severe obstacles to adaptation for the purposes of our simu-
lation. In both cases one can use only part of the original data - first 
preferences in Ireland, the first ballot in France - as the remainder 
cannot be meaningfully interpreted in regional units different from the 
original constituencies. If we have to neglect part of the original data 
the only way out is to ascertain whether the overall effect of the 
national electoral system can be approximated by some alternative 
algorithm being applied to that subset of the data which can be utilized 
for our new constituencies too. In order to fmd such an approximation 
it is necessary to study historically how the national electoral systems 
of France and Ireland have translated that part of the votes we can use 
into seats. This was done with the result that the Irish election system 
can be approximated very closely by a proportional representation 
forrnula applied solely to fust preferences. For France, we established 
and verified a simple decision rule to the effect that if we divide the 
French parties into bourgeois and Jeftist parties the canclidate receiving 
the most votes within the strenger of the two groups of parties in the 
first ballet will be elected [ 2]. 
SHIFTS IN VOTER PREFERENCES 
Shifts in voter preferences may be classified according to their 
extent, their direction, and the number of parties involved. Each swing 
between parties or groups of parties was simulated with three Ievels of 
intensity, i.e. with 2, 4, and 7 percent of the electorate shifting their 
preference either way. If one or both sides in such a process consisted 
of a group of parties, Iosses and gains were divided among the parties in 
this group according to their vote share within this group. For all nine 
nations, swings of the magnitude of 7 percent away from the result of 
the most recent national elections represent a rather extreme assump· 
tion, as empirically observed inter-election swings over the last two 
decades are way below this figure. Swings of 7 percent were neverthe· 
Jess included in the analysis to take into account the fact that the 
context of the first direct election to the European Parliament might be 
drastically clifferent from that of national parliamentary elections. 
Depending upon party system, in our analysis swings were assumed 
to occur either between parties er between groups of parties. In two- or 
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three-party systems, i.e. Britain, Germany, and Ireland, swing between 
two parties is logically possible in six directions, all of which were simu-
lated. In multi-party systems - which characterize the other six nations 
- four groups of parties were assembled along a left-right continuum, 
two groups on the left and two on the right. Appendix 2 shows into 
which group each party in each country was classified [ 3]. In multi-
party systems only swings between left and right parties or groups of 
parties were simulated. For all variants of proportional representation 
this leaves eight directions of swingtobe considered, as is illustrated in 
Table III. 
As weshall see below, present party systems cannot be expected to 
survive if a plurality system is introduced. In that case we would expect 
the parties classified as "left" and "left centre" to join into one leftist 
block, and the parties classified as "right" and "centre right" to join 
and form a rightist block. Accordingly, only two directions of swing 
remain tobe considered, i.e. from the left to the right and vice versa. 
REALIGNMENTS IN NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS 
For the direct election to the European Parliament, changes in 
national party systems have to be expected for two different sets of 
reasons. On the one hand, the reduced nurober of seats available to each 
nation compared to national legislatures will diminish the chances of 
smaller parties obtaining seats in the European Parliament. Regardless 
of electoral system, this will force the smaller parties to seek pre-elec-
tion alliances with other parties of a similar ideological background. 
Therefore, we performed all simulation runs with and without such 
alliances for all those parties which by themselves failed to win at least 
one seat and for which a suitable partner could be found. lt should be 
TABLE lii 
Directions of Swing Simulated for Multi·Party Systems 
Left Left Centre Centrc-Right Right 
(1) + 
(2) + 
(3) + 
(4) + 
(5) ... 
(6) 
(7) + 
(8) + 
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noted, incidentally that this kind of alliance can occur even without a 
formal agreement among parties if voters - facing the danger of wasting 
their votes - prefer to cast their votes in favour of ideologically related 
parties with a better chance 9f electoral success. 
On the other hand, a plurality formula requires this kind of pre-elec-
tion alliance not in order to secure "survival" in the European Parlia-
ment but in order to maximize the share Öf seats won by ideologically 
related parties. lf all sides in the game behave according to this maxim, 
two blocks will crystallize. Whenever an unambiguous left-right con-
tinuum is encountered in a multi·party system a clear dividing line 
between the leftist and the rightist block can be drawn. In the two- or 
three-party systems of Britain, Germany, and Ireland such a prominent 
dividing line does not exist, and temporarily shifting alliances are con-
ceivable. For these nations we therefore analysed two variants of block 
fonnation under a pluraHty system, i.e. the smaller parties - Liberals in 
Britain, Free Democrats in Germany, and Labour in Ireland - joining 
one of the two leading parties. These simulation results also grasp the 
two extreme situations which might occur in these three countries if the 
smaller parties' voters deserted them in the absence of formal agree-
ments. 
Some Illustrative Results 
Combining the assumptions discussed in the previous sections - con-
ceivably differentiating assumptions between individual nations - Ieads 
to an extraordinarily high number of possible distributions of seats in 
the European Parliament as a who!e. Because of the diversity of individ-
ual results, a complete and rigorous evaluation of the effects of changes 
in a single assumption is obviously impossible. What we can do within 
space constraints is to provide an overview of how the application of 
different electoral systems affects' the composition of the European 
Parliament when voter preferences in all countries of the European 
Community remain sirnilar to t~ose expressed in the most recent 
national parliamentary elections. Moreover, we want to Iook at the 
composition of the European Parliament assuming a number of shifts in 
voter preferences which now appear quite plausible. 
A system of proportional representation would all in all bring 62 
parties into the European Parliament. Their number would be reduced 
to 40 by a barrier clause of 5 percent. In Germany the right wing 
National Democrats, six French parties, two British, five ltalian, and 
eight parties from the Netherlands would be affected. A barrier clause 
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of 5 percent would bring the number of deputies not belanging to any 
parliamentary fraction down to about a dozen whereas the relative 
position of the socialist fraction would improve. 
The effects of pre-election alliances are barder to assess. Main benefi-
ciaries would be the French Gaullists, and thus the fraction of Euro-
pean Democrats for Progress and the Communist parties. Both fractions 
could gain between five and eight seats at the expense of the Christian 
Democratic and particularly the Liberal fraction. 
Because of British resistance to proportional representation, it is 
conceivable that in 1978 the traditional plurality formula would be 
applied in Britain whereas all other countries of the European Commu-
nity would adopt one or the other variant of proportional representa-
tion. This, of course, would mortally wound the British Liberals who 
could not win a single seat; the British Conservatives would benefit only 
a little, whereas Labour could contribute an additional thirteen seats to 
the Socialist fraction. 
It is highly likely that the first direct elections to the European 
Parliament will in each country be held under provisions similar to 
those governing national parliamentary elections. As these are variants 
of proportional representation in all countries save Britain and France, 
we have to focus upon these countries when we want to compare this 
parliament with one resulting from a universal application of propof.. 
tional representation. The British plurality system would eliminate the 
Liberal Party from the European Parliament. The Liberal fraction 
would furthermore be hurt by the gains vis-a-vis proportional represen-
tation which the French Gaullists could expect from the French 
national electoral system. All in all the Socialist, the Christian Demo-
cratic, the Communist, and the European Conservative fractions would 
hardly be affected, but due to the Gaullists' victory the European 
Democrals for Progress would become the third largest fraction and 
the Liberal fraction would ciecline from this rank to that of the 
smallest one in the European Parliament. 
With a plurality system the number of parties represented in the 
European Parliament would drop below thirty, and if voting blocks 
were formed it would even fall below twenty. The fractions of the 
European Conservatives and the European Democrats for Progress -
.largely composed of British, French, and lrish members- would obtain. 
roughly the same number of seats as with the application of national 
electoral systems. In France the Liberal parties would suffer signifi-
cantly, and they would be eliminated in Britain and Germany. The 
Liberal fraction, which under proportional representation would be the 
third largest fraction in the European Parliament, could not count upon 
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winning fifteen seats, which currently is the minimum nurnber for 
establishing an independent fraction. This decline of the Liberals would 
benefit the British Labour Pany and the Italian and German Christian 
Dernocrats. The most drastic increases, however, would be those of the 
Cornmunists in ltaly and France whereby the Communist fraction 
would grow tobe the third largest fraction in the European Parliarnent. 
If one assurnes that a plurality formula would Iead to a concentration 
of voters and parties the distribution of seats in the European Parlia-
ment crucially depends upon the behaviour of former Liberal voters in 
the Federal Republic of Gerrnany and Great Britain. If these voters 
predorninantly switched their preference to the Christian Dernocrats 
and the Conservatives the Socialist fraction would be weakened in 
Gerrnany and Britain to the extent of having to give up its first place to 
the Christian Democratic fraction. There could even be a real danger of 
the Socialists obtaining less seats than the Comrnunist fraction. If, on 
the other hand, forrner Liberal voters predorninantly shifted their 
preferences to !eft-centre parties the Socialist fraction could obtain a 
dorninating position in the European Parliarnent. The Christian Demo-
cratic fraction would suffer heavily from the Iosses of the CDU in 
Germany. The worst fate could befall the British Con5ervatives who 
could not be sure of getting enough seats to establish a parliarnentaey 
fraction of their own. 
With a plurality system the most spectacular winner would be the 
Cornmunist fraction, and especia!ly so if the Italian Cornrnunists 
succeeded in attracting voters from the other ltalian leftist parties. Such 
a process of unification on the left in Italy could cost the Christian 
Dernocrats there frorn 10 to 20 seats. Similarly notable changes in the 
distribution of seats can be observed for most countries of the Commu-
nity when proceeding from proportional representation to a p!urality 
system and on to a plurality system with pre-election formation of 
voting blocks. In the Federal Republic, for instance, the CDU/CSU 
would under proportional representation win 39 seats, the Social 
Dernocrats would win 35 and the Free Dernocrats 7 seats. With a plural-
ity system the Christian Dernocrats would take 48 seats and the 
rernaining 33 would go to ·the SPD. Assurning now that forrner voters 
of the Free Democrats would rather shift their vote than cast it for a 
party without any chance of winning a sing!e seat we have frorn 30 to 
60 seats for the Christian Dernocrats depending upon the assurnptions 
which we wish to make on the behaviour of those forrnerly Liberal 
voters. 
Let us now turn to the shares of seats of the present six parliamentary 
fractions and to the chances for establishing majority coalitions. With 
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voter preferences remaining unchanged the Socialist fraction would be 
the largest fraction in the European Parliament with the Christian 
Democrals ranking second with about 20 seats less. A plurality system 
in Great Britain combined with proportional representation in all other 
countries of the Community would guarantee a rnaximurn of seats to 
the Socialist fraction and at the same time the widest gap in the number 
or seats between the Socialist and Christian Democratic fractions. 
Under a system of proportional representation the European Conserva-
tives or the European Democrats for Progress would be the smallest 
fraction, if national electoral systems are adopted they will be replaced 
in that role by the Liberals. Generally speaking, the Liberal fraction is 
the one which can be the most severely hurt in the long run by the 
decision concerning which electoral system to adopt for direct elections 
to the European Parliament. National electoral systems could hurt it a 
Iot, and a plurality system ·would be Iethal. The only hope for the 
Liberals lies in proportional representation. 
The only majority coalition which consists of only two fractions and 
seems to be consistently possible is that of the Socialist and Christian 
Democratic fractions. Only if, under a system of plurality, most 
formerly Liberal voters shifted to centre-right parties might this coali· 
tion not win a majority. In Belgium, Gerrnany, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands this Iiaison would amount to a "grand coa!ition" of the 
major bourgeois and social democratic parties, so that this coalition is 
not very probable. 
The second majority coalition which is possible with voter prefer-
ences remaining unchanged is that of the Christian Democrats with all 
the other non·Socialist fractions taken together, i.e. Liberals, European 
Conservatives, and European Democrals for Progress. This coalition 
could expect to win a majority only under national electoral systems or 
with proportional representation. lf all countries were to adopt propor· 
tional representation with only Great Britain sticking to its plurality 
system or if with a universal plurality system a !arge share of formerly 
Liberal votes were to switch to left-<:entre parties, these four fractions 
tagether could not muster a rnajority in the European Parliament. This 
coalition would comprise more than two dozen parties from all nations 
of the Community with the common denominator of not being Social 
Democrat or Communist. 
The probability of a popular front of Socialists and Communists 
winning a majority in the European Parliament is very low if voter 
preferences remain unchanged. Only if a plurality system were estab· 
lished and most formerly Liberal voters in Britain and Germany were to 
cast their votes in favour of a leftist block could this kind of coalition 
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TADLE IV 
The Europeon Parllamont in 197B After Plausible ShifiS in Votcr Proferences 
Parlies 
Countries Left Lert Ccntre Cenuc-Right Right Total 
Belglum PSB WR/FDF PSC vu PLB 
7 2 9 2 4 24 
Denmark KP SOZDEM RADV VENSTRE FREM 
2 7 I 4 2 16 
Germany SPD FDP CDU 
35 7 39 BI 
Franeo PCF PS REF RI COP UDR 
17 31 I 7 I 24 BI 
Great Brita1n LAB SDLP CONS SNP uuuc 
35 I 41 2 2 81 
Ireland LAB FF FG 
2 B s 15 
Italy PCI DP PSI PSDI PRI DC PU MSI 
32 I 6 1 1 36 l 3 BI 
Luxembourg OSL SPL CSL DEM 
2 1 2 1 6 
Notherlands CPN PPR PVDA D66 OS 70 KVP VVD AR CHU SGP GPV BP 
1 I 7 I I 4 4 2 I I I I 25 
Total 54 148 169 39 410 
FRACTIONS 
Co~ntries Socialists Christian Liberals European European Communists Others Total 
Democrals Conservatives Democrals 
for Progress 
Belgium 7 II 4 2 24 
Denmark 7 5 2 2 16 
Getmany 35 39 7 81 
France 31 I 8 24 17 81 
Great Britain 35 41 s 81 
Ireland 2 5 8 15 
ltaly 7 36 2 32 " 81 Lmr.embourg 3 2 I 6 
Netherlands 7 7 4 1 6 25 
Total 134 101 31 41 34 52 17 410 
For abbreviations see Appendix I. 
N 
w 
214 
win a majority. With a universal plurality system or with the present 
national electoral systems a popular front could not count upon a 
majority even if it were to be augmented by the Liberal fraction. Under 
proportional representation such a coalition of Socialists, Communists, 
and Liberals would have a majority but because of the composition of 
the Socialist and the Liberal fractions thls coalition does not seem to be 
very likely. 
To sum up, we can say that establishing permanent and coherent 
majority coalitions in the European Parliament after the first direct 
elections will be very hard indeed if voter preferences remain roughly 
similar to those recorded in recent national parliamentary elections. It 
is therefore inappropriate to argue in favour or against specific electoral 
systems with the resulting opportunities for the formation of majority 
coalitions in rninsi. The present impossibility of establishing stable 
majority coalitions will transcend the direct elections if there are no 
major changes in voting pattems. 
Finally, Iet us turn briefly to one of the numerous possible distribu-
tions of seats in the European Parliament which result from shifts 
in voter preferences. The distribution of seats we present is the one 
which, based upon current information and events, we would call the 
mostprobable after the f"rrst direct election. The following flows ofvoters 
between parties or groups of parties have been assumed for this particu-
lar case in each country: The distribution of votes in Ire land, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal RepublicofGermany isexpected 
to remain similar to the most recent national parliamentary elections. 
In Belgium, we expect the centre-right parties to win two percent of the 
vote from left-centre parties. In Denmark, the centre-riilht parties are 
assumed to loose four percent of the popular vote to parties of the left 
centre, and in particular to the Social Democrats. The French eieetarate 
is expected to shift four percent of its vote from the Gaullist to the 
Socialist party. For Britain it seems reasonable to assume the Conserva-
tive party's vote share will grow by four percent at the expense of 
Labour. In Italy, fmally, it seems conceivable that the left, especially the 
Communist party, will gain another two percent of the popular vote 
from the Democrazia Cristiana. Applying national electoral systems to 
these voting pattems Ieads to the distribution of seats arnong the parties 
and fractions in the European Parliament which is shown in Table IV. 
Compared to actual distributions of votes in recent national elections 
we have to expect a moderate growth of the Socialist fraction due to 
over-comp(msation of British Labour Iosses by gains of the French 
Socialists. F or the fractions of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals 
practically no changes occur. The Comrnunist fraction will gain in 
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strength in Italy and - to a lesser degree - in France, whereas the 
British Conservative party will add its additional seats to its own frac-
tion. If we are not mistaken the mostprominent loser of the first direct 
elections will be the fraction of European Democrars for Progress which 
is dominated by the French Gaullists. 
The opportunities for the formation of majority coalitions in this 
parliament are basically the same as have been discussed above for 
unchanged voting patterns. All in all, two majority coalitions are con-
ceivab1e: A "grand coalition" between Socialists and Christian Demo-
crats, and a popular front supported by the Liberal fraction. A 
"bourgeois" block composed of the four non-Socialist and non-Com-
munist fractions would have exactly one half of the 41 0 seats and 
therefore have to Iook for additional support elsewhere. 
Some of the .assumptions leading to the distribution of seats in 
Table IV may be questionable upon closer examination. We take it for 
granted, however, that the first direct election to the European Parlia-
ment will bring no spectacular Iandslides either way. If we scale the 
distribution of seats in the present European Parliament from 198 seats 
to the new total of 410 seats and compare it to our prediction in 
Table IV we detect only one major difference: The Communist fraction 
will gain 19 seats, and a similar number of seats will be lost by the 
Liberal fraction. This finding is not as surprising as might seem at first 
glance as one might argue that the final agreement on the direct elec-
tion would not have been reached if its results had been thought likely 
to depart radically from present national or partisan weights within the 
European Parliarnent. 
BELGIUM 
PLB: 
PSB: 
PSC: 
KP: 
VU: 
WR/FDF: 
DENMARK 
CD: 
FREM: 
KONS: 
KP: 
Appendix 1 : Abbreviations 
Parti de Ia Liberte et du Progres/Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang 
Pani Socialiste Beige/Belgisehe Socialistische Partij 
Parti Social Chretien/Christelijke Volkspartij 
Parti Communiste Belge(Belgische Communistische Partij 
ChristeUjke Vlaamse Volksunie 
Rassemblement Wallon(Front Democratique des francophones 
Centrum Demokraterne 
Fremskridtspartiet 
Det konservative Folkeparti 
Danmarks kommunistiske Parti 
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KRISTFP: 
RADV: 
RB: 
SOZFP: 
SOZDEM: 
VENSTRE: 
VSOZ: 
GERMANY 
Kristeligt Folkeparti 
Det tadikale Venstre 
Danmarks Retsforbuncl 
Socialistisk F olkeparti 
Socialdemocratiet 
Venstre, Danmarks liberale Parti 
Venstresocialisterne 
CDU: Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich·Soziale Union 
FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei 
SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
GREAT BRITAIN 
CONS: 
LAB: 
SDLP: 
SNP: 
UUUC: 
FRANCE 
COP: 
CNi: 
FN: 
LO/LC: 
PCF: 
PS: 
PSU: 
REF: 
RI: 
UDR: 
IRELAND 
Conservative Party 
Labour Party 
Social Demoaatic ancl Labour Party 
Scottish National !'arty 
United Ulster Unionist Coalition 
Centre democratie et progres 
Centre national des independants 
Front national (de tendance fasciste) 
. Lutte oui'Tiere/Ligue communiste 
Parti communiste fran~ais 
Parti socialiste 
Parti socialiste unifie 
R<formateurs 
Republicains independants 
Union des democrates pour Ia Republique 
FF: Fianna FaU 
FG: Fine Gael 
LAB: Irish Labour Party 
ITALY 
DC: Democrazia Cristiana 
DP: Demacrazia Proletaria 
MSI: Movimento Sociale ltaliana 
PCI: Partita Camunista ltaliano 
PLI: Partita Liberale Italiano 
PRI: Partita Repubblicano ltaliano 
PSI: Partita Soeialista Italiano 
PSDI: Partita Socialista Democratieo ltaliano 
RAD: Radicali 
SVP: Südtiroler Volkspartei 
LUXEMBOURG 
COM: 
CSL: 
DEM: 
LCR: 
Llß: 
OSL: 
SPL: 
Puti communiste 
Parti chretien-social 
Parti democratique 
Ligue communiste rCvolutionaire 
Parti liberal 
Parti ouvrier-socialiste 
Part! social-democrate 
NETHERLANDS 
AR: 
BP: 
CHU: 
CPN: 
D 66: 
DS 70: 
GPV: 
KVP: 
PPR: 
PSP: 
PVDA: 
SGP: 
VVD: 
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij 
Boeren-Partij 
Christelijk-Historische Unie 
Communistische Partij van Nederland 
Democraren '66 
Democratische Socialisten '70 
Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond 
Katholieke Volkspartij 
Poütiel<e Partij Radikalen 
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij 
Partij van de Arbeid 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democrarie 
Notes 
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Nine out of the 41 0 seats in the European Parliament were not included in the 
simulation as their distribution is Iargely insensitive to shifts in the popular vote. 
These 9 seats are 1 for Greenland, 3 for West-Berlin, 2 for the French Overseas 
Departments, and 3 for Ulster. The seat for Greenland was invariably assumed to 
go to the Danish Social Democrats, the CDU, SPD, and FDP were each 
assumed to get one seat from West-Ber!in. The French Gaul!ists were assumed to 
win the 2 seats from the Overseas Departments. The Protestant Unionists were 
consistently assigned 2 and the Catholic Republicans I out of the 3 seats for 
Ulster (Lakeman, 1976). 
2 For detai!s see Rattinger, Zängle, and Zintl (I 977), sections 4.2.4.5. (France) 
and 4.2.4.7. (lreland). 
3 lt should be noted that party groupings are specific to the ideological spectrum 
encountered in each nation. lf a party is classified as "right" this does not 
necessarily imply ideological affinity to another party being classified likewise in 
another country but only indicates that both parties' relative position within 
their national party systems is at the right end of the ideological continuum. 
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Appendix 2 
IDEOLOGICAL GROUPING OF PARTIES 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Left 
KP 
SOZFP 
KP 
vsoz 
PCF 
LO/LC 
PCI 
DP 
RAD 
COM 
LCR 
CPN 
PSP 
PPR 
Left-Centre 
PSB 
WR/FDF 
SOZDEM 
RADV 
RB 
PS 
PSU 
PSI 
PSDI 
PR! 
OSL 
SPL 
PVDA 
066 
DS70 
For abbreviations, see Appendix I. 
Centre-Right Right 
PSC 
vu 
KONS 
VENSTRE 
CD 
KRISTFP 
REF 
CNI 
RI 
CDP 
DC 
PLC 
SVP 
CSL 
KVP 
VVD 
AR 
CHU 
PLB 
FREM 
UDR 
FN 
MSI 
DEM 
LIB 
SGP 
GPV 
BP 
